Yet, as Brockmeier shows, they used the word to describe the extent of the killings rather than to describe the intended destruction of Rwanda’s Tutsi population.
The genocide in 1994 was perhaps the most clear-cut case of genocide since the Holocaust: as certain actors made clear the intent to destroy the Tutsi population, hundreds of thousands were killed.
Analysts have focused on how the United Nations and a few crucial member states responded to the genocide, including the United States, France and Belgium.
Germany’s role before and during the genocide, however, has not been thoroughly analyzed.
The genocide only ended when the RPA rebels, who had abandoned the peace agreement themselves on April 8, gained control of Kigali and all government offices in July of 1994.
Hundreds of thousands of RPA supporters began to enter the country from Uganda another neighboring areas, meaning that a substantial portion of the Tutsi population that had been killed was “replaced” by a Tutsi population returning from exile.
In her research paper, Brockmeier shows how, despite warnings by German development workers and diplomats in Rwanda of the risks of large scale violence in the country, the federal government supported the Habyarimana government until its very end.
Important information about the situation in the country was not forwarded by the embassy or the German Organisation for Technical Cooperation (s.
Many of the intended targets congregated in places where they believed they would be safe, such as churches, government buildings, and factories.
Instead, those locales became massacre sites, as government forces, militia members, and other members of the civilian population attacked them en masse.