But this kind of persistence has been shown by many nations in recent history."The imperative before the Obama administration," the report says, "is to use all available tools to prevent the use and further acquisition of nuclear weapons." The Task Force is comprised of eminent leaders of the national security community and is directed by CFR Senior Fellow Charles D. The report notes that "Iran's nuclear program poses the most significant challenge to strengthening the rules-based nonproliferation regime and preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East." The Task Force underscores that bolstering the global nonproliferation regime is the best way to contain the threat of proliferation posed not only by Iran, but also by North Korea and other potential nuclear states. The Task Force notes that "the United States cannot form a more effective nuclear security system alone. All states share the responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, to prevent the acquisition of additional nuclear weapons by other states, and to redouble efforts to secure and reduce existing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials."Russia: "The Task Force emphasizes that the United States has a particular opportunity in the renewal of arms control talks with Russia and urges a revitalized strategic dialogue with Russian leaders." The Task Force notes that the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provides an opportunity to make deeper cuts in American and Russian nuclear arsenals and it applauds steps in this direction.China: While China is a "nuclear-armed rival," the Task Force notes that the United States and China "are not yet ready to form a formal nuclear arms control agreement because of the significant asymmetry between their two arsenals." Rather, the report calls for renewed military-to-military discussions with China to encourage transparency and a serious dialogue about weapons in space, including seeking a trilateral ban by China, Russia, and the United States on testing anti-satellite weapons. "Many competing interests demand President Obama's attention, but the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in December 2009, the upcoming congressionally mandated nuclear posture review, and the preparation for the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference offer the new administration an opportunity to begin to review existing treaties, revive negotiations, strengthen the global nonproliferation system, and promote best nuclear security efforts." The Independent Task Force on U. Nuclear Weapons Policy was made possible in part by generous grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Ploughshares Fund.This paper discusses two opposing trends defining the current nuclear order: the renewed salience of nuclear weapons and nuclear abolitionism.Whereas nuclear weapon states and their allies have put increasing value on nuclear deterrence in recent years, several non-nuclear-armed states and civil society highlight the urgency of nuclear disarmament. Obstacles to disarmament: security and status concerns VI.The latter trend culminated in 2017 with the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which seeks to promote disarmament by strengthening the global stigma on nuclear weapons. Most nuclear weapon states have rejected this approach and have identified the treaty itself as a threat. In his April 5 Prague speech, President Obama called for the United States to lead international efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons.A new Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force report, co-chaired by former secretary of defense William J.As both a political-military concept and multifaceted defense strategy, contemporary deterrence analytics demand stimulating new energy into “strategic thought” as a research discipline.This goal calls for a rigorous crosscutting study agenda of political, military, and social science questions examined in both foreign and domestic contexts to inform 21Topics presented here seek to open the aperture of deterrence analytic inquiry.